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I. INTRODUCTION
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides in part, “No person shall . . . be denied
life, liberty or property without due process of law.”1 Likewise, the
Fourteenth Amendment commands, “nor shall any state deny any
person life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”2
The theoretical question raised upon examining the plain text of the
above clauses is: just what kind of process is due before the
government may take away these hallowed rights? Nonetheless, the
United States Supreme Court has far too often used a clause that
indisputably invokes procedure to justify imposing substantive
limits on what the government can do.3 Whatever one thinks about
the outcomes of these “substantive” due process cases, the questions
raised in each do not suffer for want of controversy. Politically
charged issues such as labor relations, birth control, and private
consensual sexual conduct between adults, amongst a host of
others, have seen the ferocious democratic debate that surrounds
them resolved by nine unelected and unaccountable judges in the

*Mr. Kelly is an associate in the Litigation Department at Robinson Brog
Leinwand Green Genovese & Gluck, P.C. During his career, his practice has
included commercial litigation, immigration law, insurance coverage, white
collar litigation, criminal defense (New York and New Jersey), general litigation
and professional liability defense.
1. U.S. Const. amend. V.
2. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
3. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Nation’s capital.4 To be sure, the elasticity of constitutional
standards and principles can be maddening for the traditional law
student taught to memorize clear cut rules and legal practitioners
seeking to use them on behalf of their clients; but substantive due
process theory goes much further. Unlike most constitutional
doctrines, it has no cognizable ties to a clause about process, and
this paper submits it is nothing more than a thinly veiled pretext
for the most odious form of judicial legislation. Substantive Due
Process should be discarded as having no legitimate role in
American constitutional jurisprudence.

II. DAVID BERNSTEIN’S CASE IN FAVOR OF SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS
In Lochner v. New York,5 the Supreme Court held that a state
law limiting bakers to a sixty-hour work week was unconstitutional
as a violation of the “liberty of contract” that the Court maintained
was implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.6 Since that decision, Professor David Bernstein7
argues that Lochner has become the most infamous case in
constitutional theory and “shorthand for all manner of
constitutional evils.”8 He asserts that while the critics of the
Lochner decision maintain that it crafted a substantive due process
standard out of whole cloth, many state courts had been relying on
the doctrine to strike down legislation that unduly encroached on
economic liberties since the 1850s.9 Bernstein also maintains that
state courts borrowed from the dissent in the Slaughter-House
Cases10 to hold that individuals had a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in pursuing the profession or vocation of their choice
without undue interference by the state.11 Bernstein contends that
the principles of freedom of contract were so deeply rooted in
constitutional theory that decisions invoking these substantive
restrictions on legislation via the Due Process Clause became

4. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 1.
5. Lochner, 195 U.S. at 64-65.
6. Id. at 64.
7. David E. Bernstein is the George Mason University Foundation Professor
at the George Mason University School of Law in Arlington, Virginia, where he
has been teaching since 1995. He has been a visiting professor at Brooklyn Law
School, Georgetown Law Center, University of Michigan Law School, and
William and Mary Law School. Professor Bernstein teaches Constitutional Law
I and II, Evidence, Expert and Scientific Evidence, and Products Liability. He
is a contributor to the popular Volokh Conspiracy blog.
8. DAVID BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 1 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2012).
9. Id. at 10-11.
10. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
11. Id. at 17.
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commonplace as early as the 1870s.12 As such, Bernstein asserts,
“[w]hat history can tell us is that the standard account of the rise,
fall, and influence of the liberty of contract doctrine is inaccurate,
unfair, and anachronistic.”13 Bernstein goes on to discuss the
countervailing school of thought of the era, Progressive Sociological
Jurisprudence, which he claims “often masked a political agenda
that favored a significant increase in government involvement in
American economic and social life.”14 Bernstein maintains that
jurists such as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes subscribed to this
legal theory, and cared little for the individual rights that liberty of
contract substantive due process jurisprudence valued, favoring
majoritarian decision making instead.15

III. JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES’ CRITIQUE OF
LOCHNER
The most powerful critique of Professor Bernstein’s approach
is the short shrift that it gives to democratic decision making. An
ideology that views the Constitution as a document that constrains
the state from sensibly and reasonably responding to the public will
allow the courts to sit as philosopher kings, cloaking their political
dispositions under the guise of legal analysis. Justice Holmes
sufficiently responded to his critics in the first page of his classic
work, The Common Law: “The life of the law has not been logic; it
has been experience . . . The law embodies the story of a nation's
development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with
as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of
mathematics.”16 In his Lochner dissent, Holmes appropriately
began by stressing his careful reluctance to have the Court step in
to block democratic will:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of
the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed
with that theory I should desire to study it further and long before
making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because
I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to
do with the right of the majority to embody their opinions in law.17

Holmes then directly confronts the fallacy that the Due Process
Clause has barred serious encroachments on liberty of contract,
noting that Sunday laws and usury laws had long been upheld by
the Court.18 Two years before Lochner, Holmes noted that the Court
12. Id. at 18-19.
13. Id. at 6; see also Scott D. Gerber, Reason Papers, Vol. 33, at 212
(reviewing Bernstein’s critique in Rehabilitating Lochner).
14. BERNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 41; id. at 213.
15. Gerber, supra note 13, at 213.
16. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1st ed. 1881).
17. Lochner, 195 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added).
18. Id.
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upheld a law that also deeply infringed upon liberty of contract: an
outright bar on the sales of stock on the margins or for future
delivery in California’s state constitution.19 Holmes also discussed
several other cases upholding laws interfering with liberty of
contract, including the Court’s contemporaneous validation of a
statute prohibiting minors from working more than eight hours in
any given day.20 Holmes’ citation of these cases also supports the
proposition that the liberty of contract doctrine, that its supporters
claim is grounded in principles of substantive due process, is a
malleable concept that makes it easy for judges to impose their
political ideology on the rest of the country. If the doctrine was as
firm as its proponents assert, these cases should have been decided
differently.
Holmes also pens a passage in his Lochner dissent that has
become a classic in American constitutional law:
The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s
Social Statistics . . . Some of these laws embody convictions or
prejudices which judges are likely to share. Some may not. But a
constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory,
whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the
State or of laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally
differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions
natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude
our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them
conflict with the Constitution of the United States.21

Holmes maintained that the concept of liberty embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment is distorted if used as a tool to weaken
democratic action “unless it can be said that a rational and fair man
necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the
traditions of our people and our law.”22 Unlike the assertions of his
protractors, this would not necessitate spineless judicial review.
However, its greater significance seems to be a vision of American
constitutionalism that allows for inclusive politics, one which
embraces a kaleidoscope of viewpoints in responding to national
problems and is properly reluctant to disturb legislation under the
guide of a substantive due process doctrine that is imprecise at best.
Professor Bernstein does not seem to have a persuasive reply to the
thrust of Justice Holmes’ dissent. He correctly notes that some state
courts and the U.S. Supreme Court have used substantive due
process principles of liberty of contract to strike down legislation.
Still, Justice Holmes’ Lochner dissent makes it clear that, at the
very least, the doctrine has not been uniform in theory or
19. Id. (citing Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606 (1903)).
20. Lochner, 195 U.S. at 75 (citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1897)).
21. Lochner, 195 U.S. at 75-76 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
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application. This kind of concept allows judges, perhaps by design,
to run wild in a field of law already filled with vague precepts that
are hard to apply in individual cases. Unlike most constitutional
doctrines, however, substantive due process has no ties to the
procedural clause of the constitutional text it invokes. Those two
problems alone mitigate against using substantive due process as a
method of striking down legislation. In a vigorous national debate
where reasonable citizens and jurists who seek to remain faithful to
constitutional principles may disagree, the Supreme Court ought to
be reluctant to invoke a dubious doctrine to resolve the debate.
Substantive due process jurisprudence that allows and, by its
ambiguity, even encourages the Court to do precisely that should be
scrapped. In a free society, constitutional constraints on democratic
action ought not to be imposed in such a fashion.

IV. RICHARD EPSTEIN’S AHISTORICAL APPROACH TO
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Professor Richard Epstein likewise argues that up until the
late 1930s, liberty of contract was strongly protected via the Due
Process Clause.23 For support, he first cites a famous passage
penned by Justice Peckham in Allgeyer v. Louisiana:
The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the right
of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person,
as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of
the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to
use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn
his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or
avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may
be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful
conclusion the purposes above mentioned.24

Epstein says that this broad reading of liberty of contract set
the Lochner decision on solid ground nearly a decade before it was
decided.25 To buttress his position, Epstein contends that Justice
Peckham treated the New York measure at issue as a labor statute
that was outside the scope of the state government’s police power to
regulate safety and health.26 Epstein maintains that the hour
restrictions in the New York law applied only to bakers who were
in direct competition with union bakers, “not those in other lines
that might be subject to the same health and safety risks.”27
This argument misses the mark. First, Epstein’s position that

23. RICHARD EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE
UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 339 (Harvard Univ. Press 2017).
24. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
25. See EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 339.
26. Id. at 339-340.
27. Id.
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liberty of contract was strongly protected is historically inaccurate.
He is certainly right that there were some cases that held steadfast
to the doctrine, but he offers no credible distinction between these
cases and the cases Justice Holmes mentions in his Lochner dissent
in which the Court upheld far greater encroachments on liberty of
contract. Instead, he lambasts Justice Holmes’ opinion as masking
“an economic blunder by ignoring the simple point that mutual
benefits arise from voluntary exchanges no matter how great the
initial wealth differentials may be.”28 The truth or invalidly of
Epstein’s assertion here is entirely irrelevant. As Justice Holmes
emphasized, the proper question is whether this political ideology
must be constitutionalized if the rule of law is to be upheld.
Epstein’s apparent disdain for labor seems to blind him to the
reality that the legislature does not have to address a whole
problem by passing a single statute. Epstein notes that the statute
at issue in Lochner would only apply to those who were in direct
competition with unionized bakers, instead of everyone in the
industry that could be subjected to similar risks. What difference
does that make? At best, this argument sounds in equal
protection.29 The Due Process Clause should not be interpreted to
bar lawmakers from proceeding piecemeal if they deem fit. This
statute is at the very least a reasonable response to a potential
health hazard. The larger point, aside from the merits of Epstein’s
or Holmes’ approach to substantive due process, bears repeating:
the doctrine has been wildly erratic and hopelessly unpredictable in
its application. Epstein does nothing to rebut that premise.

V. JACK BALKIN’S ACCOUNT OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS
Professor Jack Balkin’s account of substantive due process
starts out with a broad outline of its historical origins, including the
rise and eventual fall of the Lochner era.30 Balkin then pivots to a
discussion that notes the Supreme Court’s use in the post-New Deal
era of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
begin applying parts of the Bill of Rights against the states.31 Balkin
maintains that the Supreme Court incorporated substantive rights,
such as freedom of speech, against the states by arguing that these
rights are part of the “liberty” protected by the Due Process
Clause.32 At first the Court did so with precepts that were already
enumerated in the Bill of Rights to the Constitution.33 However,
28. Id. at 340.
29. Where surely it would survive judicial review as it does not involve a
suspect classification, but that is outside the scope of this discussion.
30. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 245 (Harvard Univ. Press 2014).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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Balkin notes that the Court then employed substantive due process
reasoning to protect unremunerated rights such as “a fundamental
right to marital privacy, and, still later, general rights of
contraceptive use, the right to abortion, and homosexual rights.”34
Balkin proceeds to review and critique what he sees as the two
prevailing positions of the due process clause: one asserting it
guarantees mere procedural fairness and the other maintaining it
protects substantive liberties.35
Balkin then asserts that although the ideal of due process
states a principle of procedural fairness, its conception during the
Founding Father’s era “included some guarantees that we would
now consider substantive. The reason for this, however, is that
people connected procedural fairness with the separation of
legislative and judicial powers and not that the due process
principle was a general guarantee of liberty.”36 Balkin then draws
on historical evidence going as far back as the Magna Carta to
conclude that the concept of due process protected “vested” rights,
such as property, from being extinguished by the state or
involuntarily transferred from one private party to another.
Further, it required that particularized laws aimed at particular
people or groups were the province of courts, not legislators.37 With
respect to the latter, due process was said to mandate “legislatures
to create laws of general scope, which did not single out groups of
persons for special favor or disfavor.”38 After this laudable attempt
to explain some of the cobbled jurisprudence behind substantive due
process, Balkin rightly points out:
Even so, the due process clause is not a general guarantee of
substantive liberty, and therefore is not the appropriate vehicle for
most implied fundamental rights. To the extent that the Constitution
guarantees these fundamental rights, they are protected by the
privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in
conjunction with the Ninth Amendment.39

The problem with conceiving of the Due Process Clause as a
protection against substantive legislation is two-fold. First, such an
approach, as Balkin concedes, seems to be unwise: it is a tortured
reading of the Due Process Clause to interpret its mandate as a
substantive guarantee. More to the point, however, such a reading
is plainly unnecessary: several other constitutional provisions can
and do operate to stop some of the harsh results that might
otherwise flow from an outright reversal of cases establishing
constitutional rights that many, if not most, Americans now take
34. Id.
35. Id. at 246.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 246-47.
38. Id. at 247.
39. Id.
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for granted. Balkin sensibly points to the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. By its own terms, that clause
applies directly to the states; no abstract legal theory is necessary.
Perhaps the question would then become which Amendments in the
Bill of Rights have become so fundamental as to be part and parcel
of national citizenship. Using a provision that guarantees certain
substantive rights as a mechanism to determine what those rights
are would seem to have some circularity to it. However, Balkin
suggests reading it in conjunction with the Ninth Amendment,
which explicitly states that the enumeration of certain rights in the
text is not to be taken as a denial of other rights retained by the
people. A jurist could then carefully examine case law, history, and
context when deciding whether the proposed right is expressly or by
implication enshrined in the Constitution.
This approach surely invites the courts to impute their own
politics in rendering monumental decisions of which substantive
rights deserve constitutional protection, and which ones do not.
Such is the life of constitutional law. Still, jurisprudentially, it is by
far a more coherent and intellectually honest approach. It is at least
preferable to disjointed reasoning that sifts through a procedural
clause in search of substantive rights. This approach would have
the capacity of producing a more consistent and predictable body of
case law than having judges hiding behind the epistemological
maze of “substantive due process.” When the question is one of
substance, it is a more faithful reading of the constitutional text to
turn to its substantive provisions to begin searching for the answer.
In his explanation of the history behind substantive due
process, Professor Balkin provides further support, intentionally or
otherwise, to the proposition that “substantive due process” is an
imprecise and unpredictable doctrine. If anything, Balkin’s analysis
implicitly adds insult to injury: in addition to these problems,
substantive due process is conceptually flawed from the outset.
Critics may assert that a retreat from substantive due process
would extinguish hard fought victories stemming from the women’s
and gay rights movements. In reality, these landmark cases could
be more sensibly and securely maintained on other legal grounds.
In any event, these victories were largely a result of the kind of
democratic action that substantive due process has often been used
to block. Those who advocate letting democratic debate and
collective decision making drive national policy should not seek to
wrap their victories in the hollow cloth of substantive due process.

VI. THE CONSTITUTION IN EXILE?
Judge Douglas Ginsberg of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has lamented that the
Constitution’s commitments to economic liberty and limited federal
power were abandoned in the late 1930s when the Supreme Court
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started to uphold much of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New
Deal legislation against constitutional attack.40 Ginsberg asserts
that by doing this, the Court casted the “Constitution into Exile,”
its true meaning only “kept alive by a few scholars who labor in the
hope of a restoration, a second coming of the Constitution of
Liberty.”41 Judge Ginsberg cites substantive due process as one of
the doctrines that have been “exiled” and asserts that until a
resurrection occurs, economic and property rights that the
Constitution once held sacred will only be further eroded.42 Justice
Clarence Thomas and, indeed, Professor Richard Epstein have also
expressed support for this view.43
The Constitution in Exile theory deals with substantive due
process along with a host of other doctrines that the Court began to
read differently in the late 1930s, particularly the Commerce
Clause, to sustain New Deal legislation.44 The wisdom of the Court’s
more expansive reading of the Commerce Clause is beyond the
scope of this discussion, and its merits and flaws have been
thoroughly debated by jurists and scholars across the ideological
spectrum. Still, it is critical to note that the debate that surrounds
the Commerce Clause (as well as the Necessary and Proper Clause
and the Takings Clause that proponents of the Constitution in Exile
theory discuss) deals with the meaning of another substantive
provision of the Constitution: what does the power to regulate
commerce “among the several states . . .” mean in practice?45 This
school of thought does not appear to have anything persuasive to
say about using a clause that expressly mentions procedure as a
pretext to block substantive legislation. This seems particularly
problematic since Justice Thomas and other proponents of the
theory are avowed Originalists who ordinarily claim a commitment
to strict construction of the constitutional text.46 How can a jurist
profess that he or she seeks to apply the plain meaning of the text
and yet, in the same breath, assert that the due process clause is to
be read to embody substantive restrictions? At least those
professing a commitment to a living Constitution acknowledge at
the beginning of their analysis that the Constitution must be read
flexibly to adapt to the demands of a modern society. For an
40. William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J.
165 (2001).
41. Id. (citing Douglas H. Ginsberg, Delegation Running Riot, REGULATION
NO 1 at 83-84 (1995)).
42. Douglas H. Ginsberg, Delegation Running Riot, REGULATION NO 1 at 8384.
43. Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2005),
www.nytimes.com/2005/04/17/magazine/the-unregulated-offensive.html.
44. Ginsberg, supra note 42, at 83-84.
45. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
46. Nancie G. Marzulla, The Textualism of Clarence Thomas: Anchoring the
Supreme Court’s Property Rights Jurisprudence to the Constitution, 10 JOURNAL
OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE LAW 351, 360 (2002).
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Originalist like Justice Thomas to go down the same road stretches
the comprehension of a reasonable person to the breaking point.
The intellectual dishonesty of such an approach is as blatant as it
is breathtaking.

VII. THE JUDICIAL CONDEMNATION CUTTING ACROSS
USUAL LINES
Substantive Due Process has no shortage of critics across
historical and ideological lines. Justice Holmes’ fears turned out to
be well founded:
I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that I feel
at the ever increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in
cutting down what I believe to be the constitutional rights of the
States. As the decisions now stand, I see hardly any limit but the sky
to the invalidating of those rights if they happen to strike a majority
of this Court as for any reason undesirable. I cannot believe that the
Amendment was intended to give us carte blanche to embody our
economic or moral beliefs in its prohibitions . . . we ought to remember
the great caution shown by the Constitution in limiting the power of
the States, and should be slow to construe the clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment as committing to the Court, with no guide
but the Court’s own discretion, the validity of whatever laws the
States may pass.47

The conservative jurist may bristle at this source; but perhaps
Justice Antonin Scalia would command more respect. In City of
Chicago v. Morales,48 the President Ronald Reagan appointee
chastised the doctrine in dissent: “The entire practice of using the
Due Process Clause to add judicially favored rights to the
limitations upon democracy set forth in the Bill of Rights (usually
under the rubric of so-called ‘substantive due process’) is in my view
judicial usurpation.”49 With this critique, the Originalist minded
Scalia joins with the more flexible Holmes in recognizing the
incoherence of the doctrine. Still more jurists have lined up against
substantive due process. Justice Bryon White was appointed by one
of the most iconic liberal figures of the 20th Century: President John
F. Kennedy. Still, his adamant dissent in many of the Warren
Court’s landmark decisions, particularly Roe v. Wade, surely earned
him favor among many conservatives. In his dissent in Moore v.
East Cleveland,50 Justice White chided substantive due process:
[T]he Court should be extremely reluctant to breathe still further
substantive content into the Due Process Clause so as to strike down

47. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (Holmes, J. dissenting)
(emphasis added).
48. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
49. Id. at 85.
50. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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legislation adopted by a State or city to promote its welfare. Whenever
the Judiciary does so, it unavoidably pre-empts for itself another part
of the governance of the country without express constitutional
authority.51

With the addition of the moderate Bryon White, substantive
due process theory achieves the rare feat of uniting highly respected
Justices across the ideological and historical spectrum in a common
cause to discredit it. Other judicial critiques of this doctrine are
legion. This discussion exposes substantive due process for exactly
what it is and has been for over a century: the Trojan horse of
judicial legislation.

VIII. ACADEMIC CRITIQUE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Some in the legal academy have been no less forceful than
Justices Holmes, Scalia, and White in their criticism of the doctrine.
Professor John Hart Ely famously declared that substantive due
process could be seen as “a contradiction in terms- sort of like ‘green
pastel redness.’”52 Professor Daniel Conkle reminds his audience
that an appeal to custom and habit is not enough. “That substantive
due process continues to flourish is hardly enough to justify the
doctrine’s constitutional legitimacy. The Court’s decisions, from
Lochner to Lawrence, have little or no support in the constitutional
text.”53 Conkle has no shortage of respect for the concept of liberty,
but notes that “only its deprivation ‘without due process of law’
violates the text of the Fourteenth Amendment.”54 Professor Conkle
further elaborates:
Nor is there any persuasive evidence that the framers and ratifiers of
the Due Process Clause, despite their chosen language, nonetheless
intended to protect the substantive liberties that the Court has
elected to privilege. Likewise, and perhaps more to the point, there is
no persuasive evidence that these liberties were embraced by the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead the Court is
protecting values that emerge from a process of nonoriginalist judicial
decision making. Needless to say, the identification and protection of
unenumerated, nonoriginalist constitutional rights by an unelected
Supreme Court – with the Court nullifying legislative judgments on
fundamental questions of political morality – is a highly controversial
practice.55

Professor Conkle later goes on, perhaps somewhat
begrudgingly, to concede that substantive due process has enough
51. Id. at 544.
52. Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L.
REV. 63, 69 (2006) (citing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980)).
53. Id.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 77-78 (emphasis added).
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support on the Court and amongst some members of the public that
it is likely here to stay.56 Nonetheless, his critique in this passage is
a thorough one that largely echoes and supplements the views of
Justices Holmes, White and Scalia. Cronkle adds an outside
perspective that urges the Court to be wary of nullifying decisions
of the politically accountable branches of government on major
controversies of the day by appealing to a nebulous doctrine that is
not grounded in the constitutional text. Professor Cronkle’s analysis
makes it clear that there is little, if anything, in substantive due
process jurisprudence that stops the Supreme Court from imposing
its political predilections on the American public.

IX. SUSTAINED ON OTHER GROUNDS
It is undeniably true that some of the most important victories
for women’s and gay rights advocates have come under the legal
banner of substantive due process. What is to be done with these
progressive triumphs if substantive due process fades into the
annals of the more shameful parts of American legal history? A
discussion of two of these landmark cases, Griswold v. Connecticut57
and Lawrence v. Texas,58 should assure the reader that no national
emergency would ensue. Both decisions could be readily sustained
on more solid legal grounds. While the outcome of both cases is
surely the correct one, there is no need to cloak important social
advances for women and the gay community in the ruse of
substantive due process.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,59 the statutes at issue proscribed
the use of contraception and prohibited any person from aiding or
abetting such use by others.60 The Court struck down both statutes
on substantive due process grounds.61 Curiously, Justice Douglas at
first seemed to suggest the Court was making a move away from
substantive due process, avowing that the Court did not “sit as a
super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of
laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social
conditions.”62 This time, Justice Douglas assures us, things are
different: “This law, however, operates directly on an intimate
relation of husband and wife and their physician’s role in one aspect
of that relation.”63 Why this distinction matters for legal, as opposed
to political, reasons is anyone’s guess. In any event, the restoration
of substantive due process to a place of prominence in constitutional
56. Id. at 79.
57. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
58. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
59. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
60. Id. at 480.
61. Id. at 482.
62. Id.
63. Id.

2018]

Substantive Due Process: Trojan Horse of Judicial Legislation

273

law after its collapse in the post Lochner era was plainly
unnecessary to achieve the Court’s purpose.
The Court could have instead held that Connecticut’s statute
violated the Eighth Amendment: “Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted”.64 The Supreme Court, in Atkins v.
Virginia,65 nullified a sentence of death against an intellectually
disabled man who had been convicted of murder, and noted that a
national consensus had been reached: people with the petitioner’s
disability were categorically less culpable than the average
criminal.66 The Court noted that the steady and considerable shift
in public opinion, combined with its own considered judgment,
required prohibiting the execution of a intellectually disabled
person.67 The Court did so pursuant to a constitutional clause that
the majority asserted provides for a substantive standard which
contemplates a consideration of the tide of public opinion in the
legal analysis of what is cruel and unusual punishment within the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment.68
This approach would have been far more coherent than the one
the Court used in Griswold. The statute at issue there provided a
criminal sanction for the use of contraceptives in the mid 1960s.
Surely the “evolving standards of society” in the mid 1960s would
not have tolerated such a harsh result, even if legislators were not
as quick as one might hope in responding to public opinion. The
Eighth Amendment’s text plainly contemplates concern over
excessive criminal penalties. Had the Court applied an analysis
similar to Atkins when it decided Griswold, the case could have been
decided the same way without doing violence to the constitutional
text. That line of reasoning also expressly authorizes and indeed
encourages the Court to look to public opinion in fleshing out the
provisions of a substantive standard. Such a result allows the
American public to influence, without dictating, the interpretation
of some provisions of the Constitution. It should lead to more public
support for the document as an acceptable framework for
governance.
Contrast this potential rationale for sustaining Griswold with
the language from the Court’s opinion. Writing for the majority,
Justice Douglas proclaimed that past precedent suggested “specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that give them life and
substance.”69 Here, the Court boldly (or foolishly) goes where no
other Court seems to have gone before: legal reasoning based on
64. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
65. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
66. Id. at 306.
67. Id. at 322.
68. Id. at 307, 322.
69. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
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radiation. Justice Douglas then sets up a straw man in an apparent
attempt to scare his audience: “[w]ould we allow the police to search
the sacred precincts of the marital bedrooms for telltale signs of
contraceptives?”70 Without going into a discourse on constitutional
criminal procedure, it is clear that the Fourth Amendment would
put considerable restrictions on the government’s ability to barge
into a married couple’s bedroom. Under current law, ordinarily, the
police would need to secure an arrest warrant from a judge to even
enter the home under these circumstances.71 Without an arrest
warrant, or an exception to the warrant requirement, the police
could not enter a private residence.72 Since policy is what gets
funded, the wide swath of conduct prohibited by modern criminal
codes cannot always be detected by law enforcement. It seems
highly unlikely either in the 1960s (concededly before Payton was
decided) or today that the police would bring such a request before
a judge.73 Political realities and well settled legal doctrine makes
this doomsday scenario exceedingly unlikely.
Contrast this with the observations of Justice John Marshall
Harlan II’s concurring opinion. “While the relevant inquiry may be
aided by resort to one or more of the provisions of the Bill of Rights,
it is not dependent on them or any of their radiations.”74 Harlan is
quite correct to reject any reference to this kind of nonsense in a
Supreme Court decision, especially one of such tremendous
magnitude. Justice Harlan also voiced his support for a healthy
judicial restraint as an “. . . indispensable ingredient of sound
constitutional adjudication . . . .”75 Harlan is unwilling to casually
use the Constitution as a vehicle to blunt democratic will in general;
this is precisely what substantive due process does in an egregious
fashion.
In dissent, Justice Hugo Black also warns the Court of
injecting personal politics into constitutional reasoning:
I agree with my Brother STEWART’S dissenting opinion. And like
him I do not to any extent whatever base my view that this Connecticut
law is constitutional on the belief that the law is wise or that its policy
is a good one. In order that there may be no room at all to doubt why
I vote as I do, I feel constrained to add that the law is every bit as
offensive to me as it is to my Brethren of the majority and my Brothers
HARLEN, WHITE and GOLDBERG who, reciting reason why it is
offensive to them, hold it unconstitutional. There is no single one of
the graphic and eloquent strictures and criticisms fired at the policy
of this Connecticut law either by the Court’s opinion or by those of my
70. Id.
71. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-603 (1980).
72. Id.
73. Even if the police somehow spied on the couple and saw the
contraceptives from outside the residence, thereby developing probable cause to
seek an arrest warrant.
74. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J. concurring).
75. Id. at 501.
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concurring Brethren to which I cannot subscribe – except their
conclusion that the evil qualities they saw in the law make it
unconstitutional.76

The argument for judicial restraint in constitutional
adjudication reaches its zenith when the constitutional doctrine
that the Court relies upon to strike down legislation is one of the
most perplexing and contradictory ones American constitutional
law has ever known. However offended one might be by the
Connecticut law at issue in Griswold, applying this doctrine is no
answer. As discussed above, the Eighth Amendment is a far more
coherent means of striking down this statute.
In Lawrence v. Texas,77 the Supreme Court used the
substantive due process doctrine to strike down a Texas law that
proscribed homosexual sodomy.78 Justice Anthony Kennedy boldly
declares that:
Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression,
and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the
person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.79

Perhaps all of these things are true; perhaps they are not. In
any event, these concepts of liberty, not constrained by a link to a
specific substantive constitutional clause, are too easy to
manipulate to reach the outcome a particular majority of the Court
deems politically desirable.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s concurrence invoking the
Equal Protection Clause is a more precise and constrained method
for striking down the statute. “The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment ‘is essentially a direction that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike.’”80 O’Connor believed
that the statue at issue here should be reviewed under a deferential
rational basis standard, but noted that when a law is enacted with
a bare desire to harm a politically disfavored class of persons, the
Court has applied a “more searching form of rational basis
review.”81 Such a desire is not a legitimate state interest.82
O’Connor noted that the Court had been willing to apply a more
rigorous rational basis review to laws that encroach upon personal
relationships.83 Here, the Texas statute only barred sodomy

76. Id. at 508 (Black, J. dissenting).
77. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
78. Id. at 579.
79. Id. at 562.
80. Id. at 579 (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982))).
81. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 580.
82. Id. (citing Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973)).
83. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 580.
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between persons of the same sex.84 O’Connor observed the harsh
results that would occur if the convictions were upheld such as bars
to licensing and employment in certain areas of professional life and
registration of the individual convicted under the statute as a sex
offender if they had thereafter moved to any of four states:
Mississippi, Idaho, South Carolina, and Louisiana.85 She concluded
that “[t]he Texas statute makes homosexuals unequal in the eyes of
the law by making particular conduct—and only that conduct—
subject to criminal sanction.”86 The Texas statute at issue in
Lawrence was a blatant violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
While zealously protecting gay people from this invidious
discrimination, O’Connor properly noted that ordinarily our
Constitution presumes that even deeply misguided legislation will
be corrected by democratic will, not judicial fiat.87 Justice
O’Connor’s opinion should have controlled a majority of the Court
in Lawrence. Inexplicably, the Court chose to rely on the
substantive due process doctrine instead.

X.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,88 declared: “Liberty finds no refuge in a
jurisprudence of doubt.”89 Of all the admittedly malleable standards
and principles of American constitutional law, none has been as
poorly articulated and randomly applied as the oxymoronic
“substantive due process”. Principles of stare decisis should not be
religiously upheld in the name of preserving a legal theory that is
so disjointed. Most, if not all, of the Court’s decisions that the public
has come to rely on as enumerating their “substantive due process”
rights can readily be sustained on other grounds.
In the highly unlikely event that the proponent of one of these
decisions cannot articulate a superior constitutional doctrine to
uphold it, the case should be overruled and the controversy left to
the democratic process. This discussion has not advocated for timid
judicial review: the courts play a vital role in our society. However,
a judge’s role is not simply to strike down legislation that offends
his or her political preferences. The President has the sword,
Congress has the purse, and the Supreme Court has, if anything,
the legitimacy that comes with interpreting and applying our
84. Id. at 581.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985)).
88. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
89. Id. at 844.
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Constitution in a way that is enlightened, practical, and just. The
Court should not impede that venerable role by clinging tightly to a
doctrine that confuses procedure and substance. Substantive Due
Process should have no further role in the development of American
Constitutional Law.
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